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Do donors and aid intermediaries gamble with poor
people's health? Strategic decision-making by donors and
aid intermediaries on the allocation of development
assistance for health

Katharina M. K. Stepping

∗†

June 30, 2010

Abstract
The distribution of development assistance for health in sub-Saharan
Africa is the visible result of decisions made by donors and aid intermediaries. Aid intermediaries have become increasingly important as connecting link between donors and recipients. Their heterogeneous group
comprises bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organizations, private foundations, public-private partnerships and international non-governmental
organizations. Institutions, as rules of the aid game, constrain the actions
of aid intermediaries and inuence transaction costs and incentives for the
organizations. The process of aid allocation is portrayed in two repeated
sequential games with two players, the donor and the aid intermediary.
Donors pursue an array of goals by donating nancial resources, while aid
intermediaries aim at securing funding in order to guarantee their organizational survival. Donors use indicators to assess the performance of an
aid intermediary. Trustworthiness is a crucial factor prior to any experience. The strategic choice of the intermediary depends on the nancial
importance of the donor. A small-scale donor expects qualitative information about achievements, whereas a large-scale donor asks for quantitative
results. The intermediary tries to ensure funding in the long-run without
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compromising its often charitable motives too much in the short-run. Although the aid intermediary decides the aid-nanced health intervention,
the donor has an indirect but powerful voice in the aid allocation process
thanks to the importance of funding.

1

Introduction

Each year billions of dollars are transferred from developed countries to developing countries designated as foreign aid.

The resource transfer of nancial

or in-kind resources is often perceived as a linear aid chain that links a donor
government to a recipient country.

However, this predominant picture seems

overly simplied and inappropriate.

Several types of major actors have been

identied to play a strategic role in a series of linked action situations and to
be connected to each other (Gibson et al. 2005: 63). The focus of this paper
is on the interactions between donors and aid intermediaries with respect to
health interventions nanced by aid. Donors are donor governments and private donors. Aid intermediaries comprise bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid
agencies, private foundations, public-private partnerships and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

The broader denition of development

assistance employed here comprises resources from public donor, individuals,
private foundations and corporate entities.
Development assistance for health has emerged as an important branch of
foreign aid and has reshaped the institutional landscape over the past two
decades.

First, unprecedented amounts have been made available for both

foreign aid and health-related assistance,
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partly motivated by the rise of the

HIV/Aids epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa.

Total development assistance for

health quadrupled from 1990 to 2007, from a volume of $5.6 billion to $21.8
billion (IHME data). Second, private philanthropy and public-private partnerships for global health have emerged as new players during the rst decade of
the new millennium.

Large-scale contributions by many multimillionaires or

even billionaires helped to establish new private foundations, for instance. Such
a nancial contribution is small compared to government funds for foreign aid
but large compared to the average small-scale donor (Bishop, Green 2009: 12).
This has led to signicant changes in the composition of development assistance
for health.

In the 2000s, bilateral and multilateral aid agencies are still the

most prominent aid intermediaries but the importance of NGOs, global health
partnerships and private foundations increased considerably.

1 It

Particularly the

is dicult to quantify the importance of aid intermediaries for health-related devel-

opment assistance to sub-Saharan Africa.

Roughly speaking, between 1990 and 2008, sub-

Saharan Africa received two thirds of total ocial development assistance from bilateral donors
and one third from multilateral agencies. In 1990, bilateral donors provided approximately
$12 billion and multilaterals $7 billion. In 2008, bilateral donors provided approximately $30
billion and multilaterals $15 billion, after a peak of $50 billion and $13 billion, respectively, in
2007. Health-related development assistance varied considerably between 1995 and 2008 (for
which years data is available). The channels were reported for the last four years which allows
a slightly better idea of the importance of NGOs, public-private partnerships and multilateral
organizations. (OECD data).
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absolute changes are signicant because of the bigger volume of development
assistance for health (IHME data; also Lucas 2004: 290-291). Third, the global
health movement has become an important driving force for aid with a powerful
voice for prioritizing health. The predominance of health concerns within the
eight Millennium Development Goals is only example. Forth, celebrities increasingly use their popularity to advocate international assistance. A well-known
example is the musician Bono who used benecial concerts and other charitable
activities to promote the idea of ghting poverty by a substantial debt relief for
poor countries (West 2008: 77; also Bishop, Green 2009: 205).
Donors and aid intermediaries are often involved in an ongoing relationship.
The remainder of the article models the process of allocation of development
assistance for health as a multi round game with two players, the donor and the
aid intermediary. To focus on the interaction between donor and aid intermediary helps understand their decision-making.

This approach allows isolating

the strategic decisions made by the players and identifying the underlying reasons for their behavior. In the following, they will be treated as if they were
individuals.

The two parties `negotiate' the volume, frequency and length of

their `contractual' relationship. The aid intermediary is expected to maximize
funding in order to guarantee its organizational survival by securing existing
resource transfers and raising new funds. The donor is expected to maximize
their satisfaction by donating money and pursuing their objectives. Donors can
be distinguished into small-scale donor and large-scale donors by the volume
of their donation.

Two repeated sequential games are used to illustrate the

ongoing bargaining between the two parties. The rst one focuses on the interactions between a small-scale donor and an intermediary. In the second game,
a large-scale donor and an intermediary take strategic decisions.
The analysis of the aid allocation process as a game with two players may
appear simplistic given the complexities of the resources transfer in reality.
However, it allows focusing on one important aspect, the funding, and thus
is adequate to understand the rationale behind the decisions of donor and intermediary. An aid intermediary faces dierent incentive structures depending on
the nancial strength of the donor. A small-scale donor has little leverage on
the intermediary. The organization is relatively unlimited in its choices about
priorities, focus and type of interventions. A large-scale donor puts much more
pressure on the intermediary. The organization needs to provide positive results.
These dierences in the incentives provoke more ecient or less ecient programs or projects of health interventions. In addition, this paper complements
the discussion on aid eectiveness by demonstrating how much more powerful
the voices of donors and intermediaries are compared to recipients.
To summarize, the structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 links the
relevant new institutional economics literature on foreign aid to development
assistance for health. In section 3, a new perspective on health-related international assistance focusing on donors and aid intermediaries is embedded in
the discussion on aid eectiveness. Section 4 models the strategic interactions
between donor and aid intermediary as a multi round game. The nal section
of the paper is devoted to concluding remarks.
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Institutional aspects of foreign aid

Most research about international assistance focuses on the motives of donors,
the behavior of recipients and their relationship.

However, some more recent

contributions do provide some insights about aid intermediaries, mainly bilateral aid agencies. Like other organizations, also aid intermediaries are composed
of many individuals. If individual interests diverge from the collective interest,
the individual group member may not act in the best interest of the group.
Indeed, collective-action problems present a major obstacle to sustainable development outcomes (Ostrom et al. 2001: 9-11). Moreover, agents involved in
foreign aid delivery have a variety of motives and objectives which are not necessarily congruent with the ocial, publicly announced, organizational objective
(Martens 2002b: 178). It has been studied how the development assistance system generates incentive patterns that aect sustainable outcomes by exploring
the relationships among the major actors involved in international assistance
(Gibson et al. 2005: 64). To improve aid intermediaries' eectiveness, a more
explicit and systematic understanding of institutions and the incentives emerging within particular organizational structures is fundamental (Gibson et al.
2005: 224). Aid intermediaries are constrained by the rules of the aid game: institutions. Institutions and incentives are important parameters to understand
the internal processes of aid organizations. Institutions and their corresponding
organizational incentive structures aect the aid delivery process and thus the
eectiveness of foreign aid (Martens 2002a: 18).
Institutions, either inherent in development assistance or specic to the
structure of an aid intermediary such as a bilateral aid agency, may foster incentives undermining the goal of sustainable development. Institutions impact
the outcomes of foreign aid and much of its failure is related to institutions
structuring the delivery of foreign aid.

For instance, the policy process may

face incentive-related problems, perverse incentives may aect the international
development assistance process or donor agencies as well as their contractors
may suer from perverse incentives leading to undesired outcomes (Ostrom et
al. 2001: 3, also Gibson et al. 2005: 6-7). Internal organizational institutions
and incentives are crucial: Not to consider the human beings involved in the
realization of aid projects and to ignore conicting agendas between dierent
links of the aid chain, will lead one to overlook two important explanations for
failure (Carr et al. 1998: 2, 44-46).
Institutions inuence transaction costs and incentives, both for the organization as a whole and for its members.

Following the economic doctrine, all

transactions entail transaction costs. Consequently, an additional link increases
the contractual costs and risks for the parties and causes new principal-agent
problems.

One may assume that aid intermediaries must oer something to

the donor and recipient to oset the additional costs. It has been argued that
bilateral aid agencies mediate between the diverging preferences of donors and
recipients and can help to reduce transaction costs, depending on the domestic
political coalition supporting the aid program (Martens 2005: 654-655).
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Private giving and investment to the developing world can be distinguished
into philanthropy, remittances and private investment. In 2007, philanthropy
amounted to $49.1 billion, remittances to $144.6 billion, and private investment
to $325.4 billion. These three components sum up to $519 billion. Total private
nancial ows represent 83 percent of all nancial ows from developed to developing countries, compared to 17 percent of public ows (Adelman 2009: 27).
Here, these ows are taken into account as far as they involve an aid intermediary. Remittances represent a direct transfer between a member of the Diaspora
such as a foreign worker and the family as recipient, so no aid intermediary is involved. In 2006, sub-Saharan Africa received remittances of $21.8 billion (IFAD
2007: 8).

Another popular form of resource transfer between developed and

developing countries is child sponsorship (Wydick et al. 2009: 1). In any case,
it is dicult to draw a clear-cut line. Despite the growing importance of health
assistance and the increasing attention paid to global health concerns, development assistance and health are still discussed rather separately. The role that
aid intermediaries play for development assistance for health in sub-Saharan
Africa needs to be better understood. What institutions and incentives aect
aid intermediaries? How and to what extent are aid intermediaries inuenced
in their decision-making process?
Figure 1

2, 3

illustrates the resource ow of development assistance for health

using the relevant organizations for sub-Saharan Africa as an example.

The

principal actors of the aid chain are funding sources, aid intermediaries and
implementing organizations. The resources that aid intermediaries transfer can
come from public or private sources. National treasuries are the main source for
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies as well as global health partnerships. Private citizens provide funds for public sources through taxes as well as through
private donations. Private philanthropists, typically large-scale donors, are identied by the volume of their donations. Corporations also make donations, often
as part of a social marketing campaign in the spirit of corporate social responsibility.
The rhetoric about aid eectiveness tends to draw the worldwide attention to
the intended beneciaries, using the picture of needy people living in precarious
conditions. Beneciaries do matter because it is ultimately their lives which can
improve thanks to intelligent aid-nanced health interventions.

Beneciaries

can be congruent with recipients but not necessarily. In any case, beneciaries
are understood as the last link of the aid chain respectively as major actor.
This paper focuses on the interactions between donors and intermediaries. It
is argued here that the other interactions between intermediary and recipient
respectively beneciary are adequately reected in the level of the indicators

2 The

primary interest of this gure is to illustrate the resource ow and the participating

actors dierentiating between three groups: donors, aid intermediaries and recipients. Technically, aid can be given in form of grants or concessional loans, in kind and as debt relief.
For the sake of simplication, debt repayment of concessional loans or debt cancellation is not
considered further because these ows do not involve any intermediary.

3 EC

= European Commission, UN = United Nations, WB = World Bank, AfDB = African

Development Bank, GAVI = Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation.
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Figure 1: Resource ow of development assistance for health

Elaborated from IHME 2009: 14.

used by the donor to assess the intermediary's activities.
Figure 2 depicts the most important links of the aid chain and the overlapping roles of aid intermediaries for health-related assistance. This representation simplies the diuse network of organizations involved in the resource
transfer because their position with regard to the monetary ow is only one
distinctive feature. In accordance with the origin and the use of their resources,
the following three categories can be distinguished: funding, transferring and
implementing aid intermediaries.

These dierent types of aid intermediaries

constitute a very heterogeneous group. Bilateral aid agencies and private foundations can be considered as funding aid intermediaries due to the large fraction
of resources disbursed to other aid intermediaries or implementing organizations.
Global health partnerships and most multilateral aid agencies are transferring
aid intermediaries because they primarily transfer funds between donors and
recipients.

UN agencies and international NGOs can be considered as imple-

menting aid intermediaries because of the large share of development assistance
for health used to implement their own health programs and research. (IHME
2009: 15)
Implementing organizations as recipients of development assistance are another important link of the aid chain. They also have to make strategic decisions
with regard to funding and projects, for instance. The recipients are the last
agent of the principal-agent-chain foreign aid. The principal aid intermediary
as nancier expects a certain performance by the implementing organization,
needed to justify the success of an intervention nanced by the intermediary
against the donor as the original source of funding. The rst step for the aid intermediary is to raise funds. In a second step, an intermediary can decide about
its allocation. This paper focuses on the relation between donor and aid inter-
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Figure 2: Overlapping roles of aid intermediaries

Elaborated from IHME 2009: 15.

mediary. Two situations can be imagined that would cause the emergence of an
aid intermediary. In one case, resources are available and the donor searches for
a channel to transfer them and to pursue their objective  a bilateral aid agency
or a private foundation are a classic example. In the other case, an individual
or a group has identied a cause rst and then starts searching for funding to
support their objective  often the reason for a NGO to be founded.

3

A new perspective on development assistance
for health

The eectiveness of foreign aid to promote growth and development in the recipient countries has been ercely discussed for several decades. Today's probably
most powerful voices are Jerey
critic.

Sachs as advocate and William Easterly as

Sachs argues that a historically unprecedented increase of foreign aid,

a `big push', is needed to get especially sub-Saharan African countries out of
the `poverty trap' and to `make poverty history'.

Easterly

argues that aid

programs on a large scale, designed by `planners' are condemned to fail.

He

criticizes the lack of accountability, transparency and monitoring of the big
players in foreign aid.

Easterly advocates `searching' for small-scale solutions

that work in a specic contest. The ongoing discussion about aid eectiveness
between aid's critics and advocates appears to be missing two important points.
First, not all foreign aid is given for the same purpose (Lancaster 2007:
2).

Political and strategic considerations are important determinants for the

allocation of bilateral aid across recipient countries (Alesina, Dollar 2000: 33).
Donor countries provide foreign aid to promote growth and development (and
thus poverty reduction); to pursue a variety of interests with their aid such as
diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian, commercial, and cultural purposes;
to build productive capacities, to support immediate consumption and human-
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itarian needs; to support democracies and build political systems; as well as to
foster strategic economic or political purposes. Other important factors inuencing aid are widely shared ideas and norms shaping the aid-giving, the process
of political decision-making, what interests compete for inuence over the aid's
purposes, and the internal governmental organization of aid management. (Lancaster 2007: 5-6; also Clemens et al. 2004: 1)
The broader objectives of donor governments are evident in statements and
decisions on amount, country allocation and use (Lancaster 2007: 13). On the
one hand, `de jure' goals are expressed in ocial statements or documents issued
by the government.

On the other hand, `de facto' goals are visible in actual

decisions that ultimately lead to actions. Almost all donor governments have
used increases in aid as a diplomatic means, a symbol of successful state visits
or international meetings (Lancaster 2007:

13).

Donor governments usually

have to decide on several major issues each year: the amount of total aid, the
recipient countries and organizations and their respective share, the purposes of
aid, the terms and the percentage of aid tied to purchases in the donor country.

4

These decisions such as the allocation of aid by country provide clues about the
donor's intention in aid-giving and the relative diplomatic importance of the
recipient country. (Lancaster 2007: 17)
Second, not all developmental purposes have the same time horizon. Some
aid interventions have a rather long time horizon and consequently development
eects may be expected in the long-run: aid for health such as reducing infant
mortality might support growth in the long run (Clemens et al.

2004:

2).

Relaxing the linearity assumption between aid and growth as well as the aid
homogeneity assumption, a strong positive relationship is found between aid
directly aimed at growth such as infrastructure investments and growth (leaving
aside other types of aid not directly aimed at growth such as humanitarian
assistance). Not all health-related aid interventions have a long-term horizon;
curative care has a small or no time-lag between the intervention and the health
outcome.
It has also been argued that foreign aid given for the provision of global public
goods such as global health has a dierent end purpose than aid to promote
development.

Research, prevention, surveillance, treatment, and blocking of

the international transmission of diseases have a global strategic orientation
(Lancaster 2007: 16). In other words, some health interventions related to global
health have a global focus whereas the reduction of infant mortality might be
directly related to the sanitary situation in one specic place and thus has a
local focus. The time lag between an aid intervention and the health outcome
as well as the strategic focus of the health intervention is assumed to aect the
incentives for the agent aid intermediary.
Under the assumption of a direct relationship between donor and recipient,
donor motives for foreign aid seem to inuence the eectiveness of aid-nanced

4 Some

countries, such as Germany, might not decide about each of these points on an

annual basis.

The budgetary decision for partner countries as well as the identication of

priorities is usually done every three years. Despite the longer time horizon for some aspects,
the general idea remains the same: the government has to decide on it.
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interventions (Kilby, Dreher 2009: 7). It has been emphasized that the idea of
a direct donor-recipient framework for development assistance seems simplied
given the complexity of heterogeneous organizations involved in reality. Then,
it might be asked how these motives are transmitted in the longer aid chain of
donor-aid intermediary-recipient. A plausible explanation could be that donors
select the aid intermediary in accordance with their own motives in order to
ensure that their interests are pursued despite the additional link in form of the
aid intermediary.
Donors and aid intermediaries decide about the volume of aid, pursue objectives with their aid interventions and have their preferences. Their interactions
are often of repetitive nature where both parties know the written and unwritten
rules as well as the consequences of non-compliance. The bargaining between
donors and aid intermediaries about the allocation of aid involves transaction
costs. Institutions provide incentives or disincentives for a certain behavior and
thereby have an impact on the costs of a transaction. The relation is characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information between the two parties causing
uncertainty ex-ante and ex-post of the resource transfer.
Figure 3 is a ow diagram showing how aid ows between donors and aid
intermediaries.

The transfer of resources is depicted between a public donor

and a private donor, on the one hand, and health aid intermediaries in the form
of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, public-private-partnerships (PPPs),
private foundations and NGOs, on the other hand. The ow diagram is simplied because the interactions with the recipient respectively beneciary are not
illustrated.
A private donor such as a citizen or a company can decide to provide resources in the form of a voluntary donation. The aid intermediary to which the
donation is most commonly addresses is either a private foundation, a multilateral aid agency (e.g. UNICEF) or a NGO. Apart from transferring resources
to an aid intermediary, a private donor can also make a direct donation to an
implementing organization; here understood as an organization that is active
locally in a developing country, for instance, a local NGO or the local government. However, these direct donations are not further considered in this study
because they do not involve any aid intermediary.
Members of the Diaspora can also be private donors. Some successful members of diasporas might consider it  a noble deed to donate some of their resources to the needy and those in a less fortunate situation than themselves.
(Bardouille 2008: 22).

Donations usually support education and health care

services. These transfers tend to be of direct nature and are therefore not considered further.
Ocial development assistance of a donor country is nanced through taxes.
Given the indirect funding, the taxpayer has only indirect political leverage on
development assistance for health through their vote during the next national
elections. A taxpayer supposedly cares less about the marginal share of taxes
spent on foreign aid than about investments for domestic matters.
Most typically, the donor government transfers ocial aid to bilateral and
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Figure 3: Aid ows between donors and aid intermediaries

multilateral aid agencies. However, NGOs have received increasing co-nancing
from public donors in the recent past, usually channeled through a bilateral aid
agency (Koch et al. 2009: 903). Resources are also directed at public private
partnerships such as the Global Fund or the Global Alliance for Vaccines.
The public donor can also cooperate directly with an implementing organization. However, this option is not further taken into consideration because it
does not involve any aid intermediary.

Donors
Private and public donors take strategic decisions about development assistance
for health: the initial decision to donate at all, what organization to make the
donation to (direct or indirect), the volume and the frequency of the donation
as well as the duration of the nancial commitment. Their decision-making is
subjected to mainstream opinion.

5

It also depends on the behavior of other

donors. For instance, the decisions of the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
grant aid to developing countries appear to signal merit of recipients to other
donors (Dreher et al. 2010: 12). Both private and public donors have imperfect
information on the eorts of the aid intermediary. Therefore, indicators are used

5A

critical overview about thematic changes in foreign aid over the decades can be found

in Thorbecke: (2000):  The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign
Aid, 1950-2000 .
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to assess the performance of the agent and to decide about making a donation.
Private contributions may range from big donations by some individuals to
very small amounts by millions of private persons (Werker, Ahmed 2008: 78).
By denition, a donation is a transfer of resources without expecting anything
in return. A small-scale donor can usually dene what projects the donation
may be used for. However, it is dicult to control the aid intermediary. The
reputation of an organization serves as an indicator of trustworthiness for the
small-scale donor prior to any personal experiences. Only in such extreme cases
like fraud, the private small-scale donor disposes of legal remedies.

Due to

the lack of leverage, a small-scale donor stays rather passive and reacts to the
perceived behavior of the intermediary. If the expectations are not met, a smallscale donor can decide to end the nancial commitment.
It has been claimed that NGOs can reduce ex-post uncertainties about the
use of private gifts (Martens 2005: 660). However, it seems plausible to argue
that all well-regarded aid intermediaries have this potential. Any organization
with a reputation of being responsible with the donation and having as little
overhead costs as possible creates and fosters a donor's trust. The combination
of trust and reputation give the donor peace of mind and thus helps reduce ex
post uncertainties about the use of private gifts.
Private large-scale donors have more leverage on the allocation decisions
made by the aid intermediary. Thanks to the large nancial contribution, they
can attach strings to the donation.

For instance, the total amount may be

split in several smaller donations and any subsequent contribution depends on
the results presented by the intermediary. Thus, the large-scale donor has the
potential to threaten the intermediary and is not conned to passively observe
the intermediary.
The underlying motivation for a private donor can be the reduction of taxable income or true charitable motives. As mentioned, the reasons for public
donors to engage in resource transfers for health in sub-Saharan Africa can be
manifold. Their primary concern is not necessarily the ecient use of development assistance for health by the aid intermediary, since political reasons often
play a crucial role.

However, donors are assumed to maximize the possible

impact of the nancial contribution, whatever the underlying objective might
be.

Aid intermediaries
Aid intermediaries are a heterogeneous group of very dierent organizations.
With respect to

bilateral aid agencies , the organization of aid management and

its location in the bureaucratic hierarchy varies across donor countries (Lancaster 2007: 7, 22-23). Some governments have unied their aid in one independent cabinet-level agency (e.g. UK). Others have located their aid-related
activities in the ministry of foreign aairs (e.g. Denmark). Some donor countries have a highly fragmented system where policy and implementation are
separated and aid programs are located in a variety of agencies (e.g. Germany).
It might be dicult to clearly distinguish between the strategies of the donor
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government and of the bilateral aid agency. Nonetheless, regardless of the organizational arrangement, both need an environment favorable to aid and thus
aim at creating political support for aid transfers.

Multilateral aid agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) are
well-known actors setting international standards for global health.

The two

most prominent multilateral agencies in general are the World Bank and the
European Commission; two international actors  in their own right (Lancaster
1999: 184).

In all cases, a single international agency is jointly delegated by

donor governments with often diverging interests (Martens 2005: 656).
The term

non-governmental organization serves as umbrella for an enormous

range of diverse organizations which can change substantially over its lifetime.
Development NGOs vary, for instance, in size and sector of activity, religious
orientation, their function and their relationships to donors and governments.
Whereas governments need to employ  universalistic criteria and  elaborate
rationales to select clients and favor one group over another, NGOs seem to
be conceded a more selective choice of aid recipients (Lipsky, Smith 1989: 631).
To pick intended beneciaries according to religious, ethnic, geographic or other
factors may violate the unambiguous criteria used by ocial aid agencies but
is usually not being criticized in the case of NGOs (Koch et al.

2009: 904).

In addition, small NGOs tend to focus on specic activities and may be more
selective in limiting the number of recipient countries in which they engage
(Koch et al. 2009: 906).
The dependence on external funding provided by a public donor has been
identied as a major factor for the aid allocation by NGOs (Fruttero, Gauri 2005:
761).

Despite the charitable objectives of the aid intermediary, its decision-

making process may focus on the donor's preferences: What are the programmatic priorities and what benchmarks are used to assess an organization? This
provides a strong incentive for the NGO to focus on measurable results  for
instance, the short-term reduction of the infant mortality rate instead of the
long-term benets of alternative programs for HIV/Aids prevention.
Philanthropic activities are donations (in kind or monetary terms) made by

Private
foundations can act with complete independence, supporting innovative and

individuals and organizations without any desire for personal returns.

untested projects, funding research and investing their capital at below-market
rates of return.

However, their funds and sta are relatively small.

(Kramer

2008: 216)
The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (the Global Fund)
and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI) are entirely
new

public-private partnerships designed to deliver development assistance for

health in  fundamentally dierent ways than have traditional aid agencies.
(Radelet, Levine 2008:

431).

These new organizations were created because

donors apparently expected the reform and reorganization of existing agencies
to be more dicult than to establish new mechanisms with dierent operating
principles, mandates and objectives (Radelet, Levine 2008: 438).
Regardless of the dierences between these types of aid intermediaries, they
aim at securing funding in order to guarantee their organizational survival. The
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acquisition of funds is the decisive element to be part of the international aid
business. An aid intermediary is assumed to maximize funding.
Given the structure of the aid system, one can conclude that donors and aid
intermediaries are essentially involved in a bargaining situation part of a multi
round game: The ability of one player to gain his ends depends to an important
degree on the decisions that the other player will make (Schelling 1960:

5).

Each of the players tries to reach the respective objective by using dierent
strategies that take into account the reactions of the other player. Incentives and
transaction costs inuence the bargaining between donors and aid intermediaries
whose outcome is visible in resource transfers known as foreign aid. The donor
uses the reputation and trustworthiness of the aid intermediary as indicator to
make an informed decision. The aid intermediary, in turn, focuses on indicators
used by the donor to assess its performance. Game theoretical analysis will help
to understand the economic rationale behind the process of aid allocation.

4

The games

The bargaining about aid between donor and intermediary is characterized by
imperfect information on one side. In this classic principal-agent problem, the
aid intermediary has information that is not available to the donor, but the
donor has no information to which the aid intermediary does not have access.
Only the intermediary knows whether he considers fullling the expectations of
the donor.
The two players maximize their utility.

The utility numbers assigned to

outcomes of the game are ordinal utilities. They capture the player's ordering,
but neither provide they a measure of the intensity of a player's preference nor
can they be compared across players (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 9). The players'
utilities are assumed to be directly proportional to their pay-os, in other words
they are risk neutral.

4.1

Game 1: The small-scale donor

The structure of the game in extensive form is shown in Figure 5. The game
consists of two rounds.

The small-scale donor moves rst.

Small means that

her nancial contribution is not substantial for the intermediary; the donation
is  just one more .

Strategies
The nite strategy set consists of the following pure strategies available to each
player.
The donor (D) chooses among three possible strategies:
(1) {not to donate} = {n}
(2) {to donate; not to donate} = {d; n}
(3) {to donate; to donate} = {d; d}
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Figure 4: The bargaining process between small-scale donor and aid intermediary: An extensive game tree
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The aid intermediary (AI) has four possible strategies to choose from:
(1) {consider; consider} = {c; c}
(2) {consider; ignore} = {c; i}
(3) {ignore; consider} = {i; c}
(4) {ignore; ignore} = {i; i}.
In both rounds,

D chooses between donating (d) and not donating (n). AI

chooses between two basic strategies, to consider or to ignore. The rst strategy

considers (c) the preferences of the donor. AI needs to know the indicators
used for performance assessment in order to satisfy the donor's expectations
through delivering results.

AI bears costs to provide the desired outcomes
ignores (i) the

but it helps to guarantee future funding. The second strategy

donor's preferences and their signicance as preconditions for future donations.

AI does not invest to satisfy these preferences. Thus, AI saves costs because
the organization does not need to change its strategy, produce any specic
outcome or exert any other additional eort. When

D is asked to move again

in the second round, he has not observed the intermediary's behavior. In gametheoretical terms, he does not know at which information node he is.

Payos
The players are expected to rank their preferences in order to maximize their

D is the donation to be
AI. The assigned payo is the highest (P1dd = 10)).

expected utility as follows. The best possible scenario for
used in her best interest by

AI uses the donation in the expected way at least in the
(P1dd = 7). If D decides to
not make a donation, D keeps the resources but also loses the opportunity to
n
pursue its objectives. The assigned payo is low (P1 = 2). In round two, D can
also opt out which would result in two dierent outcomes. Although AI shows
the expected behavior in round one, D does not donate again in round two. D
dn
erroneously observes misbehavior by AI. The assigned payo is low (P1 = 1).
In the alternative scenario, AI indeed ignores the other player's expectations in
round one. In round two, D decides to not donate again because he correctly
The second best is if

second round. The assigned payo is relatively high

assumes misbehavior. The assigned payo is lower

(P1dn = 0).

In both cases it

D refrains from donating because he runs out of resources.
The second worst scenario for D is to assume AI to be using the donation
responsibly in the rst round. Based on this wrong assumption, D decides to
donate again in the second round, but AI ignores these expectations now. This
dd
= −1). The worst scenario for D is to donate
yields a negative payo (P1
money in both rounds and to be ignored in both. D loses resources which are
is also possible that

not used as expected. The assigned payo is negative

(P1dd = −3).

The best possible scenario for AI is to receive donations and to ignore the
D 's expectations in both rounds. AI takes full advantage of the information
asymmetry. Funding is received but no resources are invested to satisfy D 's expectations. The assigned payo is high

(P2ii = 10).

The second best outcome is

to receive donations in both rounds but to only consider the donor's preferences

15

in the second round.

AI is able to raise funds in both rounds but only starts

investing in the reputation of a reliable organization in the second round, anticipating an ongoing relationship. This outcome yields a high payo
The third best scenario is to take

(P2ic = 8).

D 's preferences into consideration in the rst
AI helps fostering a trustful

round but to ignore them in the subsequent round.

relationship by showing a responsible behavior in using the donation. However,
the relation ends on a bad note because
The assigned payo is moderate

AI lacks attention in the second round.

(P2ci = 7).

Another scenario leads to a lower

AI takes the donation seriously from the beginning and the orga-

utility level.

nization invests in a good reputation. On the one hand, it helps establishing
trust but, on the other hand, it also means that its own organizational objectives are compromised for the sake of funding. The assigned payo is moderate

(P2cc = 5).
case,

Two similar situations lead to slightly dierent outcomes: In one

D decides to stop donating in the second round and AI actually ignores

the donor's preferences in the rst round.

The relation ends after one round

AI has not diverted any resources
In the other case, D decides
to stop donating in the second round, although AI takes the donation seriously
and potential future funds are lost. However,
to satisfy

D. The assigned payo is low

(P2i = 0).

and tries to satisfy the donor's expectations in the rst round. In other words,

AI 's investment in building reputation fails. The assigned payo is negative

(P2c = −1).

Solution
According to the logic of backward induction, it is concluded what the player
moving rst will do by considering what the player moving second will do.
Players work out their strategies backwards; donor and aid intermediary induce
their beliefs about what constitutes the wisest choices by starting at the end and
then moving to the beginning (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 91). In the rst round,

D

chooses between d and n. The payo for not making a donation is relatively low

(P1n = 2).

D compares this payo to all other possible
D plays d in round one, AI decides between c and i.
For the small-scale donor, it is basically impossible to control AI and therefore
to know how the donation is being used. Even if D has access to information
about AI provided by third parties, it means that another instance is involved
As a rational individual,

outcomes of the game. If

for which reputation is again an issue. Given that the intermediary is asked to
play, in other words to decide about the behavior with respect to the use of the
donation,

AI also compares across all possible alternatives. In both cases, the

intermediary hopes for a second donation because the highest payos are related

(P2ci = 7

P2ii = 10). D

anticipates AI 's behavior and therefore
n in the second round with the possible payos
after playing d a second time. Due to AI 's preferences, D anticipates that the
second player will always play i in the second round. Given that D does not
know whether AI has taken the donation seriously in the rst place, D must act
based on previously formed beliefs. D randomizes between the left-hand side
to strategy

i

or

compares the payos of strategy

and the right-hand side, each with probability one-half. Therefore, the relevant
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((0.5x(P1dn ) = 1 > (0.5x(P1dd = −1) =
((0.5x(P2dn = 0) = 0) > (0.5x(P1dd = −2) =

comparisons are on the left-hand side

−0.5)) and on the right-hand side
−1)). Consequently, D will always opt for strategy n

in the second round. Given

this outlook,

D will not donate in the rst round because to play the strategic

combination

{d; n}

yields a lower payo than the strategy

possible strategic decisions, the game ends with

{n}.

Combining the

D playing n.

Interpretation
Apparently, the strategy

d does not seem to make much sense. Why would the

donor even bother to make resources available if he can never be sure about the
aid intermediary's behavior? The same is true for the strategy

i. If the donor

ever decided to make a donation, why would the intermediary ever bother about
the preferences of the donor? In reality, however, billions of dollars in form of
foreign aid are disbursed each year.

Donors continue to make donations and

aid intermediaries often take donor's preferences into consideration. Why? The
game appropriately portrays the situation between one donor and one intermediary in a single round game.

AI may indeed end up taking the donor's

preferences into consideration for two possible reasons.

First, due to the dy-

D moves rst, AI knows, if asked to play,
that D made a donation. At this point, AI knows that D makes a material
`sacrice' on his behalf and thus, AI experiences an urge to reciprocate. (If
namic structure of the game in which

that urge remains unfullled, the intermediary suers some `psychological' loss.
(Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 276)). Second,

AI is aware that even a small nancial

contribution from one donor is part of a much larger pool of nancial resources.
So, even though that simple small-scale donor lacks power to make a conditional
donation, the aid intermediary is aware of the importance of a good organizational reputation with regard to all small-scale donors. Thus,
incentive to use the donation for other purposes.

AI has much less

Put in a dierent way: In

AI needs to communicate the responsible
D, in turn, such documentation proves to be taken

order to maintain the nancial ow,
use of donated money. For

seriously, contributing to his satisfaction with having made a donation.
This means that in real life the aid intermediary has an incentive to establish
a good reputation over time, expressed in low overhead costs and responsible
use of donations. The optimal strategy for the intermediary is twofold: To show
and communicate the responsible use of donations as much as necessary in order
to establish the reputation of a trustworthy organization without compromising
the own objectives due to donor's preferences. The intermediary will document
projects and interventions in brochures, illustrated with pictures and informative texts.

Although also the small-scale donor wants to be informed about

the organization's activities, less information in terms of gures and graphs is
required than for the large-scale donor. The intermediary has more freedom to
identify the important issues and develop a plan of action. Under the assumption that the charitable objectives are pursued seriously, this should result in a
more eective health-aid intervention in the long-run. For instance, there is less
pressure to present a quick drop in mortality rates and more time to invest in
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prevention and education.

4.2

Game 2: The large-scale donor

Dierent from the previous game, we will now consider a large-scale donor and
an intermediary in a multi round game. Two dierences are noteworthy: First,

D has another strategic option in the second
D can sanction AI with a reduced donation to signal his dissatisfac-

dierent from the other game,
round.

tion about the previous lack of attention. Second, whereas a small-scale donor
can only vote with the feet in the subsequent round, the large-scale donor can
threaten the intermediary to reduce the donation in the next round.
experience such as a reduction in funding.
information about the agent's eort.

AI would

The principal still has imperfect

As a donor making a substantial nan-

cial contribution, the large-scale donor can expect some justication how the
nancial resources are used. The large-scale donor has access to additional information because she has means to monitor the intermediary. In other words,

D knows in which part of the information set he is in the second round of the
game. The structure of the game in extensive form is shown in Figure 5.

Strategies
The nite strategy set consists of the following pure strategies available to each
player.
The donor (D) chooses among four possible strategies:
(1) {not to donate} = {n}
(2) {to donate; not to donate} = {d; n}
(3) {to donate; to donate} = {d; d}
(4) {to donate; sanction} = {d; s}.
The aid intermediary (AI) has four possible strategies to choose from:
(1) {consider; consider} = {c; c}
(2) {consider; ignore} = {c; i}
(3) {ignore; consider} = {i; c}
(4) {ignore; ignore} = {i; i}.
As before,

D chooses between donating (d) and not donating (n) in the rst
sanction

round of the game. In the second round, he has the additional option to

(s) the aid intermediary with a reduced donation for apparent lack of attention
to the donor's preferences.

AI chooses between two strategies, to consider or to ignore the expectations
The rst strategy considers (c) the preferences of the donor:

of the donor.

which type of project is preferred, what are the expectations with regard to
health indicators etc.

AI anticipates D 's preferences and the indicators that
AI

are used as a benchmark and tries to deliver the corresponding results.

bears the costs of providing the desired outcomes but does help to guarantee
future funding.

The second strategy

ignores (i) the donor's preferences that
AI is aware of

represent preconditions for future donations. In this case, the
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Figure 5: The bargaining process between large-scale donor and aid intermediary: An extensive game tree
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D 's preferences but does not invest in satisfying them. Thus, AI saves costs
because the organization does not need to change its strategy, produce any
specic outcome or exert any other additional eort.

Payos
The players are expected to rank their preferences in order to maximize their
expected utility as follows. The initial decision to play strategy n in round one
yields a low payo

(P1n = 2).

Nevertheless, D reaches a higher utility level by

playing strategy n in round one

dn
being considered (P1

= 1)

(P1n = 2)

than to play n in round two after

respectively ignored

Under the assumption that

(P1dn = 0).

D maximizes her satisfaction with thoughtful
D is to see AI acting accordingly to

donations, the best possible scenario for

the preferences in the two subsequent rounds. The assigned payo is the highest

(P1dd = 10).
D is, if AI changes his behavior as reaction
AI previously
ignored D, the latter can successfully inuence AI. In addition, D saves some
The second best outcome for

to the sanction in the second round. Although this means that

of the resources thanks to the sanction. This strategy yields the second highest
payo

(P1ds = 9).

Two other scenarios are similar but lead to dierent outcomes. In the rst

D plays d and AI plays i in round one, but then takes D 's expectations into
D feels taken seriously
dd
in round two. The assigned payo is high (P1
= 7). In the second one, AI

one,

consideration in round two. Despite being ignored rst,

respects the donor's preferences in the rst round but then ignores them in
the second. This situation is less satisfying because it indicates a deteriorating
relationship.

AI realizes that D 's threat is only cheap talk. A threat is called

cheap talk if it costs more to carry it out to the agent who issued it than not
carrying it out (Heap, Varoufakis 2004: 132). The assigned payo is negative

(P1dd = −1).
If

AI provides the expected information, D is satised with his apparently
Nevertheless, D decides not to continue the relation and

eective donation.

stops donating in round two.

The assigned outcome is low

(P1dn = 1).

A

D has run out of resources. The decision to play
n is less inuenced by AI 's previous behavior. If AI, however, does not show
the expected behavior, D keeps his resources in round two but feels fouled by
AI. The assigned outcome is low P1dn = 0).
The second worst scenario for D is to threaten AI in the rst round and
to sanction him in the second round but without success; AI keeps on ignoring D 's expectations. This scenario is a little better because D saves some
possible reason could be that

resources thanks to the sanction, but neither the threat nor the sanction lead
to a behavioral change. The assigned payo is negative

(P1ds = −2).

AI in both rounds and to see him ignoring
D threatens twice but without any visible behavioral

The worst case is to threaten
the threat. It means that
change by
payo

AI. D loses his credibility completely. This strategy yields the lowest

(P1dd = −3).
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AI maximizes funding by securing existing resource transfers
AI is a donor who does
not sanction misbehavior directly. The most favorable scenario is to ignore D 's
preferences in both rounds without consequences. AI does not fulll the donor's
Assuming that

and raising new funds, the best possible scenario for

expectations in the rst round but is not sanctioned. The donor's threat is incredible and

D has lost his credibility. Consequently, the complete donation can
AI does not need to invest in reputation.

be used for organizational purposes.
The assigned payo is the highest

(P2ii = 10).

The second best scenario is to not be sanctioned for previous misbehavior
and to signal interest in the donor's preferences in the second round.

This

allows

AI to save resources in the rst round but to continue receiving funds

later.

This strategy allows to focus on own objectives in the rst round and

only in the second round funds are compromised to fulll donor's expectations.

(P2ic = 8).

The assigned payo is high

D 's expectations into consideration rst
AI helps securing its funding but does not invest

The third best scenario is to take
but to ignore them later.

anymore in its reputation in the second round. The credibility of the donor is
challenged. The assigned payo is high
If

(P2ci = 7).

AI takes the other player's expectations seriously in both rounds, AI loses

its independency. The own organizational objectives are compromised for the
sake of funding. The assigned payo is moderate

(P2cc = 5).

AI is to be sanctioned for misbehavior. AI
D 's preferences in the second round. The sanction in form of a reduced
donation lowers the possible funding. AI saves resources in the rst round,
A less preferable scenario for

considers

continues receiving funds, although a reduced amount, and invests some of these

AI focuses on own objectives,
D 's expectations in the second round.
ic
The assigned payo is low (P2 = 4). An even worse scenario for AI is to
be sanctioned for misbehavior and to continue playing i. AI endangers any
future relation because D gets the impression to not being taken seriously. D
sanctions AI for his previous lack of attention but the sanction does not induce
any behavioral change. AI spoils his reputation and loses potential resources
resources to satisfy the donor. In the rst round,

while funds are compromised to fulll

because of the funding cut in the second round.

The assigned payo is low

(P2ii = 1).
AI ignores D 's preferences in the rst round and,
D ends the relation in the second round. AI is able to raise
funds in one round but loses D in the subsequent round. The assigned payo is
Another scenario is that

as a consequence,
very low

(P2i = 0).

AI is to take D 's preferences into consideration in the
D ends the relation.
AI invests as organization in a good reputation but loses D nevertheless. The
dn
assigned payo is the lowest (P2 = −1). (The worst possible scenario for AI is
The worst scenario for

rst round and to nd out in the subsequent round that

to not receive any donation in the rst round. This means that the game does
not start. The assigned payo for

AI is the lowest
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(P2n = −2).)

Solution
Using backward induction, the following combination of strategies can be con-

AI is asked to play, the player knows that D has made a donation.
AI decides between strategy c and i. If D 's preferences are
considered, two things can happen. Either D plays d again or D decides to end
the relation. In the latter, AI invests in building trust with D in the rst round
but the eort is not honored in the second round. AI receives funding once but
his investment in his reputation does not pay o. If D decides to donate again
in the second round, AI decides between fullling and ignoring his expectations.
AI has an incentive to take D 's preferences into account in the second round.
However, AI will not take them into consideration in the rst round: AI risks
less but can potentially gain more by ignoring D in the rst round. Even if D
decides to end the relation after the rst round, AI is better o by ignoring him

cluded. Once

In the rst round,

during the rst round

(P2i = 0 > P2c = −1).

AI is ever asked to play, the player will rationally decide to ignore D 's
AI can expect three dierent scenarios in round two. On
the one hand, D can choose to end the relation because D notices that AI
does not take him seriously. On the other hand, if D plays d again, D can
simply make another donation or sanction AI for his previous lack of attention.
Contrary to the rst round, AI will pay attention to D 's preferences in the
If

preferences. Then,

second round, regardless of being sanctioned or not, in order to secure future
funding.

AI 's behavior, D has an incentive to play strategy s
D 's credibility is increased and it helps D to build a strong

Anticipating

in this round.
reputation.

(P1d = 1)

after the rst round

which is lower than to play strategy n in the rst place

has an

Despite the possibility to reach a payo

(P1n = 2), D

incentive to make a donation. The incentive is to establish a relationship over

D loses inuence by transferring the
AI but also has potential to inuence because AI needs the external
funding. Once D has to move again in the second round, after having observed
AI played i, D plays s in order to sanction AI with reduced funding. Given
that AI is interested in establishing a reputation as reliable organization, AI is
incentivized, for instance, to provide D with the expected improvements in the
time in which one depends on the other.

resources to

health indicators. The strategic combination

{d; i; s; c} is a Nash

equilibrium in

pure strategies. These strategies of the players are best replies with respect to
each other.

Interpretation
A large-scale donor has more leverage on the donation than a small-scale donor.

AI has an
D 's preferences into consideration in the long-run but not
directly after the rst donation. The more AI believes the donation to be a
one-shot contribution, the fewer incentives AI has to demonstrate a `respectful'

Surprisingly, this does not lead to an instant behavioral change.
incentive to take

use of the resources. However, this is counterbalanced by a general necessity to
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have a good reputation. Although

D can exert a lot of pressure to direct AI,

the latter can potentially benet from one specic aspect of health interventions
nanced with aid.

If

AI does not perform as expected, the organization was
AI simply ignored D threat-

either unable to present the required results or

ening with funding cuts. Except for curative health interventions, most health
projects have a long time horizon.

Prevention and education usually are not

able to produce immediate results. At rst sight, it could complicate the issue
of fund-raising for intermediaries:

D expects certain outcomes after one year

but the health outcome remains pretty much the same due to the type of in-

AI could be a sanction in form of
AI can also take advantage of this time lag. Assuming
that health outcomes will not change in the short-term, AI could pretend to act
in D 's interest while the organization is actually pursuing its own objectives.
This means that AI has a strong incentive to not pay too much attention to D 's

tervention. An unintended consequence for
funding cuts. However,

preferences in the short-run but rather in the long-run. Of course, the ocial
message needs to be another one in order to guarantee next year's nancial commitment by the donor.

AI needs to balance fund-raising, reputation building

and organizational objectives. The potential recipient is not necessarily on the
agenda.

4.3

Observations in practice

The analysis of the bargaining between donor and aid intermediary has shown
how the incentives lead to a situation in which the aid intermediary focuses on
the preferences of the donor. The importance of raising and securing funding
represents one crucial factor for the aid intermediary. The survival of the organization can only be guaranteed with a sound nancing concept. The dependence
on external funding has some consequences for the intermediary: Despite own
organizational, often charitable, objectives, the objectives of the donor are very
important.
The game illustrates that a small-scale donor has little direct leverage on the
aid intermediary. The intermediary takes the donation and uses it to pursue its
own objectives. A large-scale donor, private or public, has much more inuence
on the aid intermediary's behavior.

Credible threats and exercised sanctions

keep the aid intermediary on track. The bargaining over foreign aid is an ongoing process, a multi round game in which the aid intermediary's reputation
is a crucial factor to attract funding. The reputation is dened by the overhead
costs, organizational image and previous behavior.
The German structure of development cooperation can serve as an example. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(BMZ) is the main nancier of the German Society for Technical Cooperation
(gtz).

When concepts for new projects are developed, the preferences of the

ocials in the government department are anticipated. This helps to maximize
the number of projects commissioned and thus the funding. It also means that a
development expert with country-specic knowledge compromises the communicated needs of intended beneciaries for the known preferences of an ocial.
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Even if the expert is seriously interested in improving the health situation for
women and children, the bottom line is that her possibilities depend on the
nancier being convinced of the importance and success of the project.
Another consequence of the importance of funding is the discrepancy between short-term nancing interests and long-term developmental objectives
in form of improved health indicators.

The aid intermediary needs to secure

funding on a yearly basis in order to guarantee nancial stability to maintain
projects. At the same time, however, the health projects often require a longterm commitment. In particular preventive interventions with the aim to educate people about diseases and healthy behavior are often characterized by a
signicant time lag between the intervention and a measurable change in the
health outcome.

5

Conclusions

Aid eectiveness has been a contentious area of debate because, among other
things, aid allocation involves substantial resources. The allocation of aid is the
visible result of a bargaining process of several steps and with various actors.
Using development assistance for health as an example, it has been analyzed how
the dierent maximization objectives of donors and aid intermediaries inuence
their interaction. Neither private donor, nor public donor nor intermediary can
be assumed to act altruistically.

Private and public donors have a variety of

possible motivations why they make resources available.

In general, a donor

wants to maximize the possible impact of her donation in order to pursue her
objectives as eectively as possible. Aid intermediaries maintain a higher level
of accountability with donors than with recipients respectively beneciaries.
The focus on the donor-intermediary relationship provides some insights why
the needs of beneciaries are not necessarily of great importance, despite the
ocially communicated mantra.
Aid intermediaries depend on donors that provide nancial resources. An
intermediary tries to maximize its nancial possibilities that simultaneously
guarantee its organizational survival.

The aid intermediary as agent depends

on the donor as nancial source. The donor as principal depends on the intermediary as organization that uses these resources. The portrayal of aid allocation
as a game with two players has oered the following insights: Aid intermediaries depend on external funding but play an important and powerful role in
the international system of aid allocation.

The intermediary takes advantage

of the information asymmetry between the two players in order to improve its
bargaining situation.

The donor donates resources and thereby loses control

over them but, at the same time, is interested in monitoring their use. It has
been pointed out that a distinction between small-scale and large-scale donor
makes sense. The former attaches certain expectations to her donation but has
very limited means to control and put pressure on the intermediary.
The two games illustrate aid allocation as the result of a continued bargaining process between donor and aid intermediary to raise and allocate funds.
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The small-scale donor, individually, lacks the power to put any pressure on the
intermediary.

However, the much larger pool of many small-scale donors can

expect the provision of qualitative information. This means that the intermediary has an incentive to build a good reputation to attract and keep small-scale
donors. The image of a trustworthy organization is promoted by brochures and
other publicly available information.

As a result, one can conclude that the

intermediary is forced to communicate its eorts to satisfy those donors but is
relatively free in choosing its priorities for health projects, for instance. Under
the assumption that the organization cares about the intended beneciaries,
we hypothesize that the relative freedom from small-scale donors leads to more
eective and ecient programs respectively projects.
The large-scale donor has much more specic expectations attached to the
donation.

It hurts the intermediary more, if a nancially important donor is

lost (although also the sum of small-scale donors matters as has been seen
in many scandals about the abuse of donations that hit intermediaries hard).
The donor can demand specic results such as measurable improvements in
health indicators.

If the donor's preferences are completely aligned with the

organizational objectives, the external pressure could result in better outcomes.
It seems more realistic, however, that the intermediary's attention shifts to
the donor's preferences: Own organizational objectives are compromised and
resources are diverted for the sake of delivering the expected results. A largescale donor asks for quantitative results which means that the data are more
specic and probably more dicult to obtain. Under the assumption that the
organization cares about the intended beneciaries, we hypothesize that the
higher the dependence on a large-scale donor, the less eective are the programs
and projects.

The extensive focus on the donor's preferences endangers the

development and maintenance of helpful health interventions.
Despite the powerful voice of donors, particularly the bigger they are, aid
intermediaries have a chance to avoid compromising their own priorities too
much. Particularly health interventions often require a rather long-term commitment. Except for curative health care, results are not instantly visible and
often dicult to measure. As we have seen in the two games, this temporary
independence could counteract the excessive focus on short-term results. The
intermediary can take advantage of the time lag between many health interventions and their outcomes. If the intermediary can oer consistent arguments
why no immediate results can be expected from the health intervention, then the
intermediary gains additional time and increases its range for decision-making.
There is a discrepancy of short-term fund-raising and long-term health projects.
Surprisingly, more control through the donor can result in less eective and efcient health interventions. At the same time, particularly health projects and
programs provide the intermediary with an opportunity to justify the inability
to produce immediate results, with positive or negative eects. Again, under
the assumption that the organization cares about the intended beneciaries,
we can hypothesize that this temporary independence from the donor allows
for implementing more ecient aid programs.

Of course, if the intermediary

is not interested in the needs of the intended beneciaries, then this relative
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independence could have the opposite eect: The intermediary maximizes its
funding, regardless of the small-scale or the large-scale donor. This nding is
interesting in the context of the discussion on aid eectiveness.

The lack of

transparency and accountability is often criticized and better control mechanisms are demanded. However, these measures are no panacea. This analysis
demonstrates that the form of control and its impact on the incentive scheme
matters.
The additional restriction of assuming a benevolent intermediary has been
crucial for the above hypotheses. The organizational objective of an aid intermediary seems to play a decisive role in combination with the need for funding.
Particularly in the realm of NGOs, we nd very heterogeneous organizations. In
a next step, it would be interesting to analyze whether a systematical dierence
can be found between faith-based NGOs and secular NGOs. The Christian commandment to love your brother as yourself could be the distinctive feature that
results in a strong focus on the own objectives on behalf of the intermediary.
We hypothesize that Christian NGOs provide more ecient health interventions
than secular ones.
Concluding, two possible drawbacks need to be mentioned.

First, in the

analysis presented here, no distinction has been made between the individual
and organizational level with respect to donors.

A citizen is an individual,

whereas a company is an organization. Aid intermediaries have been treated as
an individual in the game but, in reality, they are organizations. In the future,
it might be important to introduce this distinction because of possible collective action problems. Second, in the game, the aid intermediary is assumed to
decide between completely ignoring and fully considering the donor's expectations. Such a sharp distinction might be inappropriate in reality because the
intermediary is more likely to decide between `a little more' and `a little less'.
The aid allocation process comprises two important steps:

acquisition of

funds and their allocation. The intermediary decides the aid allocation once the
funds have been raised. Focusing on the interaction of donor and intermediary,
the two games have illustrated how several factors can counteract each other
such as the dependence on funding, the need for measurable results, the time
lag inherent in many health interventions etc.
This more detailed understanding of the decisions involved in handling development assistance for health in sub-Saharan Africa could be applied in conjunction with empirical data to further delineate the roles of donors and aid
intermediaries in the promotion of basic health care on the African continent.
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